понедельник, 11 мая 2009 г.

Cold war manifesto and plans of atomic bombing of the USSR


The international situation after the Second World War was complicated and unambiguous. What was needed was a principally new concept of international relations. The Anti-Hitler coalition dissolved quite fast, and serious differences were accumulating between former allies.

On March 5th 1946 former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill made his famous speech at Westminster college in the American town of Fulton. The speech came to be known as the ‘Cold War Manifesto”, declared by the West against the Soviet Union.

Today it seems that only historians know the contents of Winston Churchill’s Fulton speech. However, due to various reasons, it is quite often mentioned both in the West and in our country. Its importance is so great that we decided to remind you of some of the excerpts from this extremely long speech, which defined the attitude of the West to the USSR.

“A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytizing tendencies. It is my duty however, for I am sure you would wish me to state the facts as I see them to you, to place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe.

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.

Whatever conclusions may be drawn from these facts — and facts they are — this is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up. Nor is it one which contains the essentials of permanent peace. The safety of the world requires a new unity in Europe, from which no nation should be permanently outcast. Surely we should work with conscious purpose for a grand pacification of Europe, within the structure of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. That I feel is an open cause of policy of very great importance.

However, in a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist center. Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United States where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization. These are somber facts for anyone to have to recite on the morrow of a victory gained by so much splendid comradeship in arms and in the cause of freedom and democracy; but we should be most unwise not to face them squarely while time remains. I have felt bound to portray the shadow which, alike in the west and in the east, falls upon the world. I do not see or feel confident in the future of our haggard world at the present time.

On the other hand I repulse the idea that a new war is inevitable; still more that it is imminent. It is because I am sure that our fortunes are still in our own hands and that we hold the power to save the future, that I feel the duty to speak out now that I have the occasion and the opportunity to do so. I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. But what we have to consider here to-day while time remains, is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries.

From what I have seen of our Russian friends and Allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness. For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.”

In conclusion of his speech, which he named “Sinews of Peace”, Winston Churchill called on the USA and other English-speaking countries to “reach now, in 1946, a good understanding on all points with Russia under the general authority of the United Nations Organization.” However, he added that these relations should be maintained not only by the authority of the UN, but by the whole strength of the USA, Great Britain, and the entire English-speaking world and its allies.”

A Dean of the 20th Century Political History Chair of Moscow State University Nikolai Zlobin, commenting Winston Churchill’s visit to the USA and his Fulton speech, voiced the following considerations:

“Churchill publicly placed USA President Harry Truman before a political choice. The attitude towards the USSR in the United States at the time was quite ambiguous. The public sympathies were with the “Russian allies”, while “Uncle Joe” (in other words – Joseph Stalin) generated a great deal of respect among the common Americans. At the end of January 1946 Truman announced that the USA was prepared to develop the UN organization as a representative body of the whole world and all of society”. In these conditions the President also gambled on the forthcoming speech of the British politician. On the one hand, it could influence the soviet leadership, yet on the other hand it could also be a test of public opinion in the country. If the speech was received positively, they could boost the anti-soviet orientation of foreign policy, and if not – they could always back out by referring to Churchill’s speech as no more than his own personal opinion, and an expression of his right to freedom of speech.

For the time being the diplomatic tone of the USA in negotiations with the USSR remained subdued and of a persuasive nature”

Former soviet intelligence officer Alexander Feklisov, in connection with Winston Churchill’s speech, wrote the following in his memoirs:

“…in the mid-1940’s our one-time allies in the anti-Hitler coalition were bringing forward a program of American-British dominance in the world, a program that spanned not just the coming few years, but many decades to come. Doctrines of ‘deterrent” and for “repelling” communism were being elaborated. These programs laid out on paper the reasons why Washington and its allies should conduct relations with the USSR and its allies only from a position of force. They insisted that Moscow acknowledged only ‘clublaw’. So those elaborating these doctrines recommended limiting or even curbing all economic, trade and cultural ties with the soviet block; to cease granting the Soviets credits, ban the export there of modern technologies, which we were in dire need of after the war. For a long time our people were obliged to go without in the name of gaining victory over the common enemy – fascist Germany and its satellites. In line with these doctrines the USA was to unleash an uncontained nuclear and conventional arms race, forcing the USSR to spend vast, exorbitant sums on defense, instead of channeling them into the national economy, agriculture, and other vital needs. The policy of deterrence and containment, according to its authors, was supposed to bring Stalin to his knees. For its practical implementation, in the second half of 1947 the USA conducted a reorganization of the top state leadership.”

“In the words of intelligence officer Alexander Feklisov, the newly-established central bodies of government in the USA were guided by the directive that the very existence of the Soviet Union presented a threat to the USA. So they devised a number of plans aimed at toppling the existing regime in the USSR and in countries of Eastern Europe.



Recently published archive documents testify, according to the intelligence officer, that there existed elaborate plans in the USA of a nuclear attack on the USSR. The first such plan was elaborated at the end of 1945. It’s known under the code name “Totality”. In 1948 two other similar plans were laid before Harry Truman. And in 1949 yet another, more superior plan, codenamed “Dropshot”. Commenting these plans, Alexander Feklisov writes:

“The principal idea of all these plans of preemptive war, their major concept – is a surprise attack with atom bombs targeting major administrative, industrial and strategic centers of the Soviet Union. In Washington they gambled on a surprise attack because the Pentagon was convinced: it will deliver irreparable damage to the military-economic potential of the USSR, since, according to information gleaned by American intelligence, the Kremlin leaders were not anticipating a sudden attack of the USA on the Soviet Union.

The “Totality” plan targeted the destruction of twenty of the top soviet cities by nuclear and conventional bombs, dropped from planes which will leave bases in England and other West European countries. According to “Dropshot” … the start of military operations was scheduled for January 1st 1950. In three months they planned to drop bombs on targets in 100 soviet cities.”

All these plans, according to intelligence officer Alexander Feklisov, presupposed that the atom bombings will be followed up by the occupation of the Soviet Union by American troops. In line with secret directive № 20\1of the National Defense Council dated August 18th 1948 a new regime would be established in the USSR, which, firstly: wouldn’t possess any significant military potential; secondly: would be economically dependant on the USA and the western world; thirdly: wouldn’t have much authority or power over the leading ethnic groups populating the USSR, and, fourthly: wouldn’t put up any ‘iron curtain’ or anything resembling it on its borders.

The officer stresses: “Just think: what was considered there was an elimination of existing power in the USSR and the latter’s obliteration as a great and powerful state.”

Why did the leading circles in the USA abandon their plans at the end of the 1940’s – early 1950’s? Alexander Feklisov explains it thus:

“It has now become known that plans of a pre-emptive strike at the USSR sparked heated debates and arguments in Washington. Sober-minded politicians had raised their voices to insist that it was unrealistic to hope to score a swift victory over the Soviet Union relying on massive bomb attacks, even nuclear ones. There was always the possibility the USA might lose that war. The following arguments were put forward: “firstly, a predominant part of the population of the USSR was known for its courage, patience, fortitude and patriotic sentiment; secondly, the Kremlin was exercising centralized government over the Soviet Union with the aid of a thorough and precise mechanism; thirdly: theoretical communism was very attractive ideologically; fourthly: the soviet regime had proved its ability to mobilize the population in support of its military efforts, and, finally, the remarkable perseverance of the Red Army in conducting military activity in the most complicated conditions, as the first two years of the Great Patriotic war had demonstrated.

Opponents of the idea of a Third World War in Washington also noted that in their estimates, despite big losses incurred from atomic bombings during the first days, nonetheless in the following 20 days the USSR could occupy Western Europe. And in 60 days, with the help of intensive bombings it could disable America’s chief ally – Great Britain, with its bases that are of primary importance for American bomber aviation. By the end of 6 months of military activity the Soviets could occupy the northern shores of the Mediterranean from the Pyrenees to Syria, assume control over the Gibraltar Strait and seize oil-rich regions in the Middle East…”

Even judging by this cursory survey of the political and military situation in the post-war world one could draw the conclusion that there was a real threat of a new war breaking out.

However, was the Soviet Union right after World War Two really such a threat to the so-called “free world”? Doctor of History Valentin Falin answers the question thus:

“The answer to this question is contained in American documents. Let me refer you to reports made by American Army Headquarters and those filed by the Intelligence Agency. In the words of the American army analytics, “the Soviet Union does not present any immediate danger. Its national economy and labor potential have been depleted in the war. Accordingly, in the following years the USSR shall concentrate its efforts on rebuilding the internal national potential, setting itself limited diplomatic objectives.”

The American Intelligence espoused such estimates right up until 1947, when it was ‘called to reason’ and told that before attempting to delve into others’ souls it had best learn to understand its own leadership. While the supreme authorities – as represented by the President and his entourage – sentenced the USSR to non-existence, since its very existence was allegedly a threat to the security of the USA.

…Peaceful co-existence was declared impossible, while its proponents were disclaimed as ‘propitiators’ and agents of forces hostile to the American way of life. No matter how complaisant Moscow might have been in 1945-1947, it would never have managed to soothe Washington and allay its fears. The USA was not preoccupied with the quality of soviet policy, but the very fact of the existence of a potentially much too strong state that hampered the country of ‘unlimited opportunities’ to assert its unlimited global domination.”

In one interview Doctor of History Valentin Falin was asked what day and year could be regarded as the end of the ‘cold war’.

“I hate to disappoint you,” Valentin Falin said, “but in my opinion the ‘cold war’ hasn’t ended, since its groundwork – Russophobia – still exists. It’s an evil and tenacious phenomena, that can be substantiated by many historical examples. Will the disappearance of the Soviet Union make people see light? Some in the West still consider the semi-break-up of Russia as an intermediate variant…”

Source:The voice of Russia

1 комментарий:

Chernevog комментирует...

This war was a particularly bad period in many ways. Allies during the war quickly reverted to their mutual suspicions shortly afterwards.

Nations on both sides were frantically attempting to create a nuclear weapon, and after the two bombings in Japan, it was discovered that the Japanese were about ten days away from testing their own nuclear weapons in Hungnam, North Korea.

The story of the Japanese effort to make a nuclear weapon for use towards the end of the war. Part of Russia's nuclear weapons program was greatly accellerated by the large amounts of heavy water it was able to obtain from the Hungnam facility which was huge, and Russian intelligence simply had better information on the facility than American or British intellegence was able to acquire.

Just as both the Russian and American missile and space programs were able to take advantage of some of the German advances in rocket technology after the surrender of Germany, Russian nuclear scientists were able to take advantage of what the Japanese scientists had been working on during and towards the end of the war. As the war came closer to an end, and it became obvious to them that they would lose it, work on their bomb project proceded at an almost frantic pace. Because they had less and less time to develop some breakthrough, their chief designer attempted to use some shortcuts which allowed them to accept less than optimal solutions to create a bomb, such as creating a warhead that would compress the subcritical mass elements in 1/20th or 1/30th of a second rather than the 1/200th or 1/300th of a second that was used in the American and Russian atom bombs. This would have resulted in less of the fissile material actually going critical and a much lower bomb yield, with the design plan later examined would result in a two to kiloton explosion, one tenth of the power of the first bombs dropped on Japan, the Japanese bomb would have worked as well as the ones dropped on Japan had they had a larger quantity of fissionable material placed in them.

The most absurd assertions of the Cold War were that there were nuclear "secrets". Once physicists had determined that nuclear fission was possible to begin with, the only thing left was the engineering design of the weapon, which was not all that complicated. The only problem that existed was keeping two subcritical masses of uranium separate until they could be brought together and highly compressed a large enough chunk of uranium or plutonium could explode on its own, theoretically, but that would take more material than it would be feasible to move from the place it was made, to the place it was intended to destroy.